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Notes 
FUNERAL PROTEST BANS:  DO THEY KILL 
SPEECH OR RESURRECT RESPECT FOR THE 
DEAD? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In funerals across the country, protestors often fill the solemn air 
with lyrics like the following: 
First to fight for the fags 
Now you’re coming home in bags 
And the Army goes marching to hell 
Proud of all of your sin 
No more battles you will win 
And the Army goes marching to hell 
Chorus: 
Then it’s I.E.D.s 
The Army’s on its knees 
Count off the body parts all gone (Two! Three!) 
And where e’er they go 
The dying soldiers show [(or) The crippled soldiers show] 
That the Army keeps marching to hell! 
Crimes you praise in your ranks 
Getting blown up in your tanks 
And the Army goes marching to hell 
Hating God; coward’s hearts 
Ziploc bags for body parts 
And the Army goes marching to hell 
(Chorus) 
Serve a rag, God’s hate grows 
See the tags on all your toes? 
And the Army goes marching to hell 
For a tyrant you fight 
God destroys you with His might 
And the Army goes marching to hell1 
                                                 
1 Westboro Baptist Church, http://www.godhatesfags.com/writings/patriotic_songs. 
pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007) (identifying the lyrics of the song titled “The Army Goes 
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Members of the Westboro Baptist Church (“WBC”), led by Fred 
Phelps, use songs like this one, along with placards, and flyers when 
they protest at veterans’ funerals.2  Although the WBC’s message, that 
God is punishing America for tolerating homosexuality, is not welcomed 
by most Americans, it is their practice of choosing funerals to deliver this 
message that has outraged the public at large and led government at all 
levels across the country to respond with funeral protest bans.3  Since 
2005, more than half the states proposed or passed funeral protest bans, 
and even more are likely to draft similar legislation in the future.4  The 
federal government responded as well, on Memorial Day 2006, when 
President Bush signed the “Respect for Fallen Heroes Act,” setting time 
and distance restrictions on protestors and demonstrations at military 
funerals held in national cemeteries.5 
                                                                                                             
Marching to Hell”).  Similar songs have lyrics tailored for Marines, Navy members, and 
homosexuals.  Id. 
2 Westboro Baptist Church, http://www.godhatesfags.com [hereinafter Westboro] (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2007) (providing information, photos, video, audio, sermons, fliers, songs, 
and picketing schedules for their organization and demonstrations). 
3 Alan Phelps, Note, Picketing and Prayer: Restricting Freedom of Expression Outside 
Churches, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 271, 272 (1999) (picketing in areas that typically are not used 
for protests can draw more attention); David L. Hudson Jr., Overview Funeral Protests, Oct. 
2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/assembly/topic.aspx?topic=funeral_protests 
[hereinafter Hudson] (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).  According to the National Conference of 
State Legislatures, thirty-four states have introduced similar bills and twenty-seven of 
those have passed them following in Kansas’ footsteps, including: Alabama, Colorado, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin.  Id.; see also The Associated Press, Congress Votes to Restrict Protests at National 
Cemeteries, May 25, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16933 
[hereinafter Associated Press 16933] (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (noting that more than two 
dozen states are considering restricting protests at non-federal cemeteries); Ronald K.L. 
Collins, A funeral for free speech?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, http://www.first 
amendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=16775 [hereinafter Collins] (last visited Sept. 4, 
2006) (stating that thirty-two states have passed or are considering similar laws). 
4 Hudson, supra note 3.  Federal Heroes Act calls states to act in Section Four: “It is the 
sense of Congress that each State should enact legislation to restrict demonstrations near 
any military funeral.”  Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act, H.R. 5037, 109th Cong. 
(2006); 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006); S. 421, 2006 sess. (Kan. 2006), available at 
http://www.kslegislature.org/bills/2006/421.pdf; MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501 (West 2006) 
(Kansas changed its statute after its first funeral protest ban failed in a court challenge by 
WBC, and Missouri also passed two different versions of a ban). 
5 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (prohibiting demonstrations or picketing within 300 feet of a national 
cemetery for one hour prior to and one hour after a funeral, memorial service, or ceremony 
with penalties that include a fine or prison up to one year or both); Associated Press 16933, 
supra note 3 (explaining that the House Bill was first sponsored by Representative Mike 
Rogers after he attended a protested military funeral in March of 2006); 10 KWTX, Bush 
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Despite different political or religious views about the WBC, the Iraq 
War, or homosexuality, the majority of Americans, as well as our courts, 
have recognized that respect is owed to the dead, their burial places, and 
to the privacy of their families.6  Although most Americans sympathize 
with the families who have to endure WBC protests while trying to 
mourn the loss of their loved ones, funeral protest bans raise serious First 
Amendment concerns.7  As a result of the clash of constitutional rights 
between protestors and mourners occurring at funerals across the 
country, state legislatures are attempting to address and constitutionally 
reconcile these newly passed bans.8 
                                                                                                             
Signs Funeral Protest Ban, May 29, 2006, http://www.kwtx.com/home/headlines/ 
2890486.html [hereinafter 10 KWTX] (last visited Oct. 1, 2006). 
6 Phelps, supra note 3, at 286 (describing how many states have laws that ban 
disruptions of religious services, such as funerals); Mary L. Clark, Treading on Hallowed 
Ground: Implications for Property Law and Critical Theory of Land Associated with Human Death 
and Burial, 94 KY. L.J. 487 (2005) (explaining how the law has recognized respect for the 
dead and sanctity of land associated with death and burial, providing examples of property 
law exceptions for places associated with death, and pointing to government creations of 
cemeteries and memorials throughout history from the Civil War and Pearl Harbor 
Memorial to the Arlington National Cemetery and now the World Trade Center sites).  
Clark, a professor at American University Washington, has stated, “[e]very humane 
instinct urges that the last resting place of the dead should be preserved from profanation, 
and the desecration of such place should make a strong appeal to the conscience of the 
court.”  Clark, supra, at 497.  Places of worship, like churches, have also been interpreted as 
sacred spaces in America.  Id. at 497 n.16. 
7 See Hudson, supra note 3.  Robert D. Richards, director of the Pennsylvania Center for 
the First Amendment, stated that “[t]he rationale behind these laws is to stop an offensive 
type of expression . . . but that’s the very type of expression the First Amendment continues 
to protect.”  Id.  As First Amendment scholar Ronald K.L. Collins said, “[i]t is a simple 
truth: The highest respect we can pay to our fallen war dead is to respect the principles for 
which they made the supreme sacrifice.  We honor them by honoring those principles of 
freedom – even when a callous few vainly attempt to demean the dignity rightfully due 
them.”  Id.; see also The Associated Press, Anti-Gay Church Says It Won’t Violate New Funeral-
Protest Laws, Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16614 
[hereinafter Associated Press 16614] (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).  WBC member Shirley 
Phelps-Roper stated, “[w]e’re waiting until all the legislatures’ [sessions] are over to see 
what tattered shreds they’ve left the Constitution in.”  Associated Press 16614, supra.  But 
see The Associated Press, Officials Push for Illinois Law to Curb Protests Outside Funerals, 
Jan. 1, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16301 [hereinafter 
Associated Press 16301] (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).  As Army Staff Sgt. Jeremy Doyle’s 
stepmother, Sandy Doyle, said, “[t]hey have a right to protest.  That’s what our son died 
for, but not at arm’s length . . . The families need to have some sense of security.”  Id.  Lt. 
Governor Pat Quinn stated, “[a] hate group cannot use its right to speak hateful words to 
cancel out and heckle and harass others who are seeking to exercise their First Amendment 
rights to practice their religion, to assemble, and to speak in memory of someone very near 
to them.”  Id. 
8 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (noting a privacy interest in avoiding 
unwanted communication that changes in varying contexts); see also infra Part II.C 
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Part II of this Note discusses the WBC as the leading impetus behind 
the legislation, examines recently drafted state funeral protest bans, 
provides an overview of the First Amendment issues, and considers 
similar protest bans in other contexts.9  Building on this background, 
Part III analyzes the constitutional strengths and weaknesses in the 
drafting of these recent bans.10  Part IV proposes a model statute, based 
on arguments from the analysis, as to how a funeral protest ban can be 
constitutionally drafted to benefit states that pass a ban in the future or 
those states that may need to alter their current legislation if it fails in 
any future court challenges.11  Finally, Part V concludes that funeral 
protest bans are rooted in the general public’s support for maintaining 
the privacy and solemnity of funerals and mourners, as well as respect 
for the dead, and that these bans, if carefully drafted, will likely survive 
despite their constitutional challenges and provide the best remedy to 
the clash of rights in this conflict.12 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The main legal issue in this Note centers around whether recent 
funeral protest bans violate the First Amendment.13  Part II.A provides 
an overview of WBC and its tactics, as the WBC largely provided the 
impetus for the legislation at issue.14  Part II.B examines current and 
proposed state funeral protest bans.15  Part II.C provides the analytical 
framework and precedent for First Amendment analysis.16  Finally, since 
no court has ruled on the newly passed bans, Part II.D examines similar 
speech restrictions in the abortion context, as well as older church related 
cases, to examine how they fared in the court system and to provide 
                                                                                                             
(providing a First Amendment overview of this issue) and Part III.A (analyzing the 
constitutionality of the statutes). 
9 See infra Parts II.A-D (providing background information about WBC, funeral protest 
bans, and First Amendment analysis dealing with restrictions on speech). 
10 See infra Part III (hypothesizing that most of the statutes are likely constitutional, 
based on the analysis section of this Note). 
11 See infra Part IV (providing a model statute that is content-neutral on its face, contains 
clearly defined terms, is not vague or overbroad, sets reasonable distance and time 
requirements, and is equally enforceable against all groups in violation). 
12 See infra Part V (concluding that carefully drafted bans are the best remedy to this 
issue). 
13 U.S. CONST. amend I.  The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  Id. 
14 See infra Part II.A (generally discussing WBC). 
15 See infra Part II.B (discussing recently passed state funeral protest laws). 
16 See infra Part II.C (providing the First Amendment framework for analysis). 
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guidance as to how to draft a constitutional speech restriction.17  
However, since neither the WBC nor mourning families will willingly 
compromise their rights in this conflict, a constitutionally drafted ban is 
the best way to resolve this conflict that the WBC began when it 
protested its first funeral.18 
A. Fred Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church 
Fred Phelps, the leader of the WBC, an independent Christian group 
based out of Topeka, Kansas, is the primary impetus to the recent 
legislation.19  The WBC has about one hundred members, most of whom 
are related to Phelps either by blood or through marriage.20  Their main 
belief and often-repeated message is that God is punishing the United 
States for tolerating homosexuality.21  They use picketing and protest 
demonstrations to voice this message.22  Although military funeral 
protesting has gained them the most attention, WBC has also picketed at 
                                                 
17 See infra Part II.D (discussing similar restrictions in other contexts). 
18 See infra Part V (concluding that a constitutionally drafted ban is the best remedy in 
this conflict of rights); see also Associated Press 16933.  Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist 
stated, “[i]t’s a sad but necessary measure to protect what should be recognized by all 
reasonable people as a solemn, private and deeply sacred occasion.”  Associated Press 
16933; see also Adriana Colindres, Bill Would Limit Protests at Military Funerals, SPRINGFIELD 
STATE JOURNAL-REGISTRAR, Jan. 11, 2006, available at 2006 WL 666465 (quoting Lt. Gov. Pat 
Quinn of Illinois, who said, “[n]o grieving military family should be subjected to vile 
epithets and signs at the funeral service of their loved one who has made the ultimate 
sacrifice for our country.”). 
19 Westboro, supra note 2.  Phelps has had a long history of political involvement, trying 
to advocate his anti-homosexual message.  Id.  He gained national attention as the leader of 
this controversial group in 1998 when WBC picketed the funeral of Matthew Shepard, a 
homosexual hate crime victim.  Id.  His family, many of whom are lawyers like Phelps, 
makes up a large portion of WBC members and takes an active role in demonstrations.  Id.  
Phelps was disbarred in 1979 in Kansas and has been arrested and charged with several 
crimes.  Id. 
20 See generally Westboro, supra notes 2, 19. 
21 Westboro, supra note 2.  According to WBC’s beliefs, events and deaths caused by 
9/11, the Iraq War, and Hurricane Katrina are punishments from God because the U.S. 
tolerates homosexuality.  Id. 
22 Westboro, supra note 2.  Past pickets have included gay pride gatherings, political 
events, Starbucks openings, memorials for 9/11 and Sage Mine victims, and funerals of 
homosexuals and veterans.  Id.  WBC posts a weekly picket schedule.  See 
www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/Picket_Information.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2007). WBC 
also provides several other websites where information about their beliefs and photos of 
past demonstrations can be seen.  Westboro, supra note 2 (referencing 
www.godhatesamerica.com, www.hatemongers.com, and www.thesignsofthetimes.net); 
see also Judy Keen, Funeral Protestors Say Laws Can’t Silence Them[.] Their Belief: Troops Dying 
Because USA Tolerates Gays, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 2006, available at 2006 WL 15933998 
[hereinafter Keen] (discussing WBC picketing for over fifteen years at schools, churches, 
and funerals). 
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non-military funerals and even hospitals and hotels in order to spread its 
message and beliefs.23 
WBC’s songs, messages on placards, and choices of places to protest 
homosexuality have brought it media attention, criticism, and, now, 
restrictive legislation.24  Since their first military funeral protest in June of 
2005, WBC members have protested 162 funerals.25  Although their 
tactics are controversial and the source of inspiration for funeral protest 
laws, WBC members argue that their speech is protected and that the 
bans are content-based violations of the First Amendment.26  Despite 
                                                 
23 Bob Von Sternberg, Funeral Protest Causes Furor Among Legislators, STARTRIBUNE, Feb. 
24, 2006, http://www.startribune.com/587/v-print/story/269563.html [hereinafter 
STARTRIBUNE] (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (describing how WBC’s focus has changed from 
protesting funerals of AIDS victims to funerals of soldiers); Collins, supra note 3 (noting 
how WBC is expanding its picketing policy to hospitals of wounded soldiers); The 
Associated Press, Lawmakers in 2 States Target Funeral Protests, Jan. 25, 2006, 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16354 (last visited Oct. 1, 2006) 
[hereinafter Associated Press 16354] (stating that WBC would protest the funerals of West 
Virginia coal miners); Keen, supra note 22 (describing how WBC targeted a hotel that had a 
rainbow flag in Kansas).  University of Kansas law professor Steve McAllister believes that 
this legislation may benefit WBC by giving their message attention and possible legal fees if 
they are successful in any constitutional challenges of these laws.  Id. 
24 See generally Westboro, supra note 2.  The WBC pledge of allegiance states: “We pledge 
allegiance only to God / And pray he destroys America / And all the people in the land / 
More dead soldiers/ More lost limbs / Taking vengeance / On the disobedient / Bringing 
His justice to all.”  Id.; see also The Associated Press, Kentucky, West Virginia Join States 
Trying to Bar Protesters From Funerals, Feb. 2, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ 
news.aspx?id=16414 [hereinafter Associated Press 16414] (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) 
(quoting Brandy Sacco, widow of a soldier, as saying “[t]hey choose to abuse these rights 
by harassment of a grieving wife and family.  Such a lack of common decency should not 
be protected by law but punishable by the law . . . . The hardest thing I ever had to do in 
my life was to listen to their nonsense.”); Molly McDonough, Picket Fencing: Laws Blunting 
Church’s Protests Worry First Amendment Experts, 92 A.B.A. J. 16 (2006) [hereinafter 
McDonough] (stating that their tactics include chanting songs and holding signs that say 
“God Hates Fags” and that military funeral protesting since 2005 has given their message 
more attention); Associated Press 16614, supra note 7 (citing Phelps-Roper, who, when 
referring to states passing legislation restricting funeral protests, said, “[w]e’re thanking 
them kindly.  They drew a huge amount of attention to our message, and that’s all we’re 
doing is delivering a message.”).  See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, No. RDB-06-1389, 2006 WL 
3081106 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2006).  In this case, Albert Snyder sued Phelps and WBC in the 
U.S. District Court of Maryland for defamation, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and invasion of privacy due to the signs and protests at his son’s 
funeral and statements made on WBC’s website.  Id. 
25 Keen, supra note 22 (using a figure that reflects WBC activity from June 2005 through 
September 2006). 
26 Hudson, supra note 3 (stating how WBC argues that the bills are content and 
viewpoint based and violate First Amendment principles); The Associated Press, Missouri 
Funeral-Protest Bill Sent to Governor, Feb. 23, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ 
news.aspx?id=16532 [hereinafter Associated Press 16532] (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).  Shirley 
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new laws and unwelcoming communities, WBC members believe they 
have been successful in getting their message across.27  The Patriot 
Guard Riders, a group of motorcyclists who oppose WBC picketers at 
funerals, and local public figures have taken matters into their own 
hands and have tried to address WBC’s funeral protesting in their own 
ways.28  In addition, other remedies to curb funeral protesting include 
using the tort system or enhancing already existing disturbing the peace 
statutes.29  However, since WBC members feel strongly about their 
message and First Amendment rights to continue picketing, funeral 
                                                                                                             
Phelps-Roper said, “[t]hey’re going to give away rights that they claim these soldiers have 
died for?  They’re going to spit in their graves – for what?  Some words?”  Associated Press 
16532, supra. 
27 See generally Keen, supra note 22.  WBC pickets as many as three funerals a week and, 
since August of 2006, has targeted fifteen funerals in thirteen states.  Id. 
28 Associated Press 16614, supra note 8.  The Patriot Guard Riders are a group of 
motorcyclists who attempt to overshadow the anti-gay protestors with flags, patriotic 
messages, and chants.  Id.  See Keen, supra note 22 (noting that there are 53,000 Patriot 
Guard Riders nation-wide); Ryan Lenz, Motorcyclists Roll to Soldier Funerals to Drown Out 
Protestors, STARTRIBUNE, Feb. 21, 2006, http://www.startribune.com/484/v-print/ 
story/260171.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).  As Kentucky Patriot Guard Rider, Dan 
Woodrick, stated, “[w]hen a total stranger gets on a motorcycle in the middle of winter and 
drives 300 miles to hold a flag, that makes a powerful statement.”  Lenz, supra; see also 
Jacques Steinberg, Air Time Instead of Funeral Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A14.  Talk-
radio show host Mike Gallagher approached the matter somewhat differently—by giving 
WBC almost an hour of air time on October 5, 2006, for their written promise not to picket 
the funerals of five young girls killed that week in their Pennsylvania school by a gunman.  
Steinberg, supra.  See also McDonough, supra note 24 (stating that legislation alone is 
unlikely to stop WBC protestors who are very cautious and notify law enforcement and the 
media in advance, follow directions, and agree on a time and location for their protest 
demonstrations).  But see Associated Press 16614 (explaining that WBC cancelled funeral 
demonstrations in Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin in March of 2006, all of 
which had new funeral protest legislation). 
29 See Snyder, 2006 WL 3081106 (discussing the Snyder lawsuit’s claims of emotional 
distress due to WBC protesting).  However, suits are time-consuming and costly.  See 
Funeral Protest: Court Asked For Repayment, YORK DAILY RECORD, Aug. 30, 2006, 
http://www.ydr.com/portlet/article/html/fragments/print_article.jsp?article=425993 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (stating that it took Snyder more than twenty times to serve WBC 
with fees of almost $6,000 and that he filed a motion to recover those fees in a federal 
defamation suit against WBC for protesting his son’s March funeral); McDonough, supra 
note 24, at 16 (noting how, according to experts, if the bans enhance disturbing the peace 
statutes and are narrowly drafted they are more likely to be upheld).  Although these 
options may be less intrusive on speech, funeral protest bans will be more effective and put 
the burden of bringing a lawsuit on the protestors like the WBC.  But see Alan K. Chen, 
Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 90 (2003) [hereinafter Chen] (“Continuing First Amendment 
doctrine on its current path will inevitably lead to more superficially neutral attempts to 
target speech regulations.”). 
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protest bans, if constitutionally drafted, are the most effective way to 
resolve this conflict of rights.30 
B. Current State Funeral Protest Bans 
The funeral protest bans recently passed in many states, within a 
relatively short time, are the result of legislative concern about protecting 
the privacy of mourning families and preventing emotional distress at 
funerals caused by any protestors.31  Support for these bills crosses party 
lines, which allows them quick passage.32  Most of the protest bans 
include distance and time requirements surrounding funeral 
demonstrations, as well as serious punishments against violators that 
include hefty fines and even jail time.33  To provide a sampling of 
legislation and different tactics states have used, the following key states 
are first generally discussed and then later compared:  Kansas, Indiana, 
                                                 
30 McDonough, supra note 24.  Shirley Phelps-Roper has stated, “[i]f we were standing 
out there with signs that say, ‘God Bless America,’ we would not be having this 
conversation.”  Id.; 10 KWTX, supra note 5.  WBC members held signs that said “Thank God 
for Dead Soldiers” and “Bush killed them” three hundred feet away from Arlington 
National Cemetery on Memorial Day, 2006, when Bush signed the “Respect for America’s 
Fallen Heroes Act.”  10 KWTX, supra note 5. 
31 See The Associated Press, Indiana Enacts Funeral-Protest Law, Mar. 3, 2006, 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16584 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) 
(quoting Indiana Senator Brent Steele, who said “I have heard from thousands of Hoosiers 
on this issue and they almost unanimously feel this is the right thing to do for the families 
of our fallen heroes and the funerals of all Hoosiers.”); The Associated Press, South Dakota 
Governor Signs Bill Restricting Funeral Protests, Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.firstamendment 
center.org/news.aspx?id=16475 [hereinafter Associated Press 16475] (last visited Oct. 1, 
2006) (citing South Dakota’s House Speaker Matthew Michels’ reference to mourning 
family members: “We are free because these people have fought and died for 
us. . . . Everybody’s entitled to protest, but you are not entitled to cause grief upon grief.”).  
See generally Hudson, supra note 3. 
32 38 U.S.C. § 2413.  The Act was introduced in the House on March 29, 2006; considered 
and passed on May 9, 2006; considered in the Senate and presented to the President on 
May 25, 2006; and signed on Memorial Day, 2006, with a total of 207 co-sponsors (99 
Democrats and 108 Republicans).  Id.  See generally Part II.B (describing similar cross-party 
sponsorship and expediting of bills as seen in the states); The Associated Press, Iowa 
Governor Signs Bill Restricting Funeral Protests, Apr. 18, 2006, http://www.firstamendment 
center.org/news.aspx?id=16779 (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (noting that the Iowa Governor 
enacted the law one day before a planned funeral picket by the Westboro Baptist Church); 
Associated Press 16532, supra note 26 (explaining that the Missouri bill took effect as soon 
as the Governor signed it); Associated Press 16301, supra note 7 (stating that no one testified 
against the funeral protest legislation in the Indiana committee hearing, and it was 
endorsed unanimously). 
33 See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text. 
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Illinois, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Maryland, Ohio, Florida, South 
Dakota, Missouri, and Kentucky.34 
Kansas, WBC’s home state, is one example of a state that already had 
a law banning funeral demonstrations, but it was ultimately found 
unconstitutionally vague.35  The newly enacted bill, passed almost a 
decade later, bans picketing and protest marches within 300 feet of a 
funeral service, except for public places within the buffer zone, for one 
hour before and two hours after the funeral service, and violations are a 
misdemeanor.36  Similar distance and time restrictions were enacted in 
other states.37 
                                                 
34 See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text. 
35 Associated Press 16354, supra note 23; The Associated Press, Legislators Propose Bills 
Barring Protests at Funerals, Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ 
news.aspx?id=16064 [hereinafter Associated Press 16064] (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).  In 
Kansas, a 1995 law prohibiting similar protesting outside of funerals was found to be too 
vague.  Associated Press 16064, supra.  However, by later including time restrictions, a 
similar law was enacted.  Id.; see also Hudson, supra note 3 (referring to the same law and 
stating that Phelps challenged a Kansas Picketing Act in the 1990s that later was ruled by a 
federal judge as unconstitutionally vague because of its terms “before” and “after” a 
funeral instead of specific time restrictions). 
36 Associated Press 16532, supra note 32; Kan. S. 421.  The bill, as of October 7, 2006, read: 
(1) ‘‘Funeral’’ means any ceremony, procession or memorial service in 
connection with the death of a person. 
(2) ‘‘Picketing’’ means protest activities engaged in by a person or 
persons stationed before or about a cemetery, mortuary, church or other 
location where a funeral is held or conducted within one hour prior to, 
during and two hours following the commencement of a funeral. 
(e) It is unlawful for any person to: 
(1) engage in picketing or a directed protest march at any public location 
within 300 yards of any entrance to any cemetery, church, mortuary or 
other location where a funeral is held or conducted within one hour prior to, 
during and two hours following the commencement of a funeral; or 
(2) obstruct or prevent the intended uses of a public street, public sidewalk or 
other public space while engaged in picketing or a directed protest, as 
described in subsection (1). 
Kan. S. 421 (emphasis in original).  Punishment for violators may include a Class B 
misdemeanor and assessment of damages and attorney fees.  Id. 
37 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., H.R. 1382, 2006 Leg. (Colo. 2006), 
available at http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics2006a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/CDF6B09F14AF6C 
658725713300592865?open&file=1382_enr.pdf (stating that Colorado sets 100 foot 
restriction); S. 1833, 169th Leg. (N.C. 2006), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/ 
Sessions/2005/Bills/Senate/HTML/S1833v4.html (explaining how North Carolina sets a 
300 foot restriction one hour before, during, and one hour after); H.R. A2870, 212th Gen. 
Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/PL06/ 
93_.PDF (establishing that New Jersey has a 500 foot restriction immediately prior to, 
during, and after a funeral service); H.R. 97, 79th Leg. (Tex. 2006), available at 
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For example, on March 2, 2006, the Indiana legislature enhanced its 
disorderly conduct statute to make picketing within 500 feet of a 
cemetery or burial a Class D felony.38  Similarly, Illinois prohibits 
protests, even visual images conveying fighting words, within 300 feet of 
any facility used for funeral services.39  In Wisconsin, as of February 20, 
                                                                                                             
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/793/billtext/pdf/HB00097F.pdf (noting how, 
similarly, Texas has a 500 foot restriction from one hour before to one hour after a service). 
38 Hudson, supra note 3; Associated Press 16584 (stating that it is disorderly conduct to 
protest within 500 feet of a funeral, procession, burial, or viewing, punishable as a felony 
offense with six months to three years in prison and a $10,000 fine); see also IND. CODE § 35-
45-1-3 (2006), available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2006/SE/SE0005.1.html.  
The statute states: 
(a)  A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally: 
(1)  engages in fighting or in tumultuous conduct; 
(2)  makes unreasonable noise and continues to do so after being 
asked to stop; or 
(3)  disrupts a lawful assembly of persons; commits disorderly 
conduct, a Class B misdemeanor 
. . . . 
(c)  The offense described in subsection (a) is a Class D felony if it: 
(1)  is committed within five hundred (500) feet of: 
(A)  the location where a burial is being performed; 
(B)  a funeral procession, if the person described in 
subsection (a) knows that the funeral procession is taking 
place; or 
(C)  a building in which: 
(i)  a funeral or memorial service; or 
(ii)  the viewing of a deceased person; is being 
conducted; and 
(2)  adversely affects the funeral, burial, viewing, funeral 
procession, or memorial service. 
IND. CODE § 35-45-1-3 (2006). 
39 Hudson, supra note 3; Associated Press 16301, supra note 7 (describing the Illinois 
Governor’s signature of the statute “Let Them Rest in Peace Act,” which bars 
demonstrations within 200 feet of funerals shortly before, during, and after services); see 
also H.R. 0772, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006), available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=094-0772.  The Act states: 
(b)  For purposes of this Section: 
(1)  “Funeral” means the ceremonies, rituals, processions, and 
memorial services held at a funeral site in connection with the 
burial, cremation, or memorial of a deceased person. 
(2)  “Funeral site” means a church, synagogue, mosque, funeral 
home, mortuary, cemetery, gravesite, mausoleum, or other place 
at which a funeral is conducted or is scheduled to be conducted 
within the next 30 minutes or has been conducted within the last 
30 minutes. 
(c)  A person commits the offense of disorderly conduct at a funeral 
or memorial service when he or she: 
(1)  engages, with knowledge of the existence of a funeral site, in 
any loud singing, playing of music, chanting, whistling, yelling, 
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2006, individuals are prohibited from loud protests or displaying visual 
images that convey fighting words within 500 feet of a funeral from one 
hour before to one hour after a funeral.40  Nebraska introduced an 
amendment expanding its state’s anti-picketing law to include any 
picketing within 100 feet of any funeral being conducted.41  Similarly, an 
Oklahoma act signed into law on March 6, 2006, prohibits protests 
within one hour prior and two hours after funerals.42  In Maryland, 
                                                                                                             
or noisemaking with, or without, noise amplification including, 
but not limited to, bullhorns, auto horns, and microphones within 
200 feet of any ingress or egress of that funeral site, where the 
volume of such singing, music, chanting, whistling, yelling, or 
noisemaking is likely to be audible at and disturbing to the 
funeral site; 
(2)  displays with knowledge of the existence of a funeral site 
and within 200 feet of any ingress or egress of that funeral site, 
any visual images that convey fighting words or actual or veiled 
threats against any other person; or 
(3)  with knowledge of the existence of a funeral site, knowingly 
obstructs, hinders, impedes, or blocks another person’s entry to or 
exit from that funeral site or a facility containing that funeral site, 
except that the owner or occupant of property may take lawful 
actions to exclude others from that property. 
Ill. Pub. Act 094-0772 (Ill. 2006).  A violation of the statute results in a Class C 
misdemeanor.  Id. 
40 Hudson, supra note 3; S. 525, 2005 Leg. (Wis. 2005), available at http://www.legis.state. 
wi.us/2005/data/acts/05Act114.pdf. The Wisconsin bill states: 
947.011 Disrupting a funeral or memorial service. 
(1)  In this section: 
(a)  “Facility” includes a cemetery in which a funeral or 
memorial service takes place. 
(b)  “Funeral or memorial service” includes a wake or a burial, 
as defined in s. 157.061 (1), but does not include a service that is 
not intended to honor or commemorate one or more specific 
decedents. 
(2)  . . . 
(a)  No person may do any of the following during a funeral or 
memorial service, during the 60 minutes immediately preceding 
the scheduled starting time of a funeral or memorial service if a 
starting time has been scheduled, or during the 60 minutes 
immediately following a funeral or memorial service: 
1.  Engage in conduct that is prohibited . . . within 500 feet 
of any entrance to a facility being used for the service with 
the intent to disrupt the service. 
2.  Intentionally block access to a facility being used for the 
service. 
S. 525, 2005 Leg. (Wis. 2005). 
41 Hudson, supra note 3. 
42 Id.; see also S. 1020, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2006), available at http://webserver1.lsb. 
state.ok.us/2005-06SB/SB1020_int.rtf.  Oklahoma’s law states, in part: 
B.  The purposes of this section are to: 
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House Bill 850 would ban funeral protests within an hour prior to the 
funeral, making it a crime to obstruct mourners from funerals or burials, 
and making violations a misdemeanor.43  Finally, Ohio bans picketing or 
any other protest activity within 300 feet of a funeral for one hour before 
and after a funeral.44  The aforementioned states exemplify the current 
trend in legislation. 
Some state legislation, however, has caused more controversy.45  For 
example, Florida uses more general language and punishes anyone who 
                                                                                                             
1.  Protect the privacy of grieving families within one hour 
prior to, during and two (2) hours following the commencement 
of funerals; and 
2.  Preserve the peaceful character of cemeteries, mortuaries 
and churches within one hour prior to, during and two (2) hours 
following the commencement of funerals. 
C.  As used in this section: 
1.  “Funeral” means the ceremonies, processions and memorial 
services held in connection with the burial or cremation of the 
dead; and 
2.   “Picketing” means protest activities engaged in by a person 
or persons within five hundred (500) feet of a cemetery, mortuary 
or church within one hour prior to, during and two (2) hours 
following the commencement of a funeral. 
S. 1020, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2006).  Violations may carry a fine up to $500 dollars, jail 
up to thirty days, or both.  Id. 
43 Associated Press 16532, supra note 26; see also H. R. 850, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 
2006), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2006rs/bills/hb/hb0850f.pdf.  The Maryland 
law provides: 
(A) A person may not, for 60 minutes immediately preceding a 
funeral, burial, memorial service, or funeral procession that has a 
scheduled starting time, or during the 60 minutes immediately 
following a funeral or memorial service: 
(1)  Knowingly obstruct, hinder, impede, or block another 
person’s entry to or exit from the funeral, burial, memorial 
service, or funeral procession; or 
(2)  Display a visual image that conveys fighting words against 
another person within 500 feet of: 
(i)  An entrance to a funeral, burial or memorial service; or 
(ii)  A funeral procession. 
(B)   A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and 
on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or a 
fine not exceeding $1,000 or both. 
H. R. 850, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006). 
44 H.R. 484, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=126_HB_484_RS. The bill specifies: 
[N]o person shall picket or engage in other protest activities, nor shall 
any association or corporation cause to be picketed picketing or other 
protest activities to occur, within three hundred feet of any residence, 
cemetery, funeral home, church, synagogue, or other establishment 
during or within one hour before and during or one hour after the 
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“willfully interrupts or disturbs” a military funeral with a misdemeanor 
charge.46  On February 13, 2006, South Dakota signed a bill prohibiting 
picketing likely to cause emotional distress to a grieving family within 
1,000 feet, one hour before to one hour after a funeral service.47  South 
Dakota’s distance requirement is one of the most extreme.48  Similarly, in 
                                                                                                             
conducting of an actual funeral or burial service at such that place. No 
person shall picket or engage in other protest activities, nor shall any 
association or corporation cause to be picketed picketing or other 
protest activities to occur, within three hundred feet of any funeral 
procession.  As used in this section, “other protest activities” means 
any action that is disruptive or undertaken to disrupt or disturb a 
funeral or burial service or a funeral procession. 
Id. (underlining and striking as it appears in the bill to reflect the final version passed). 
45 See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. 




 The Florida bill states: 
(2) Whoever willfully interrupts or disturbs any assembly of people 
met for the purpose of acknowledging the death of an individual with 
a military funeral honors detail pursuant to 10 U.S.C. s. 1491 commits a 
misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 
or s. 775.083. 
Id. 
47 S. 156, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2006), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/ 
2006/bills/SB156HST.pdf.  It provides: 
Section 1. No person may engage in any act of picketing at any funeral 
service during the period from one hour before the scheduled 
commencement of the funeral services until one hour after the actual 
completion of the funeral services. Any violation of this section is a 
Class 2 misdemeanor. Each day on which a person violates this section 
constitutes a separate offense. 
Section 2. Notwithstanding the criminal penalties provided in section 1 
of this Act, thecircuit court may enjoin conduct proscribed by section 1 
of this Act and may in any such proceeding award damages, including 
attorney fees, or other appropriate relief against any person who is 
repeatedly found guilty under this Act. 
Section 3. For the purpose of this Act, the term, picketing, means 
protest activities engaged in by any person stationed within one 
thousand feet of a funeral service within one hour prior to, during, and 
one hour following the commencement of any funeral service. 
Section 4. For the purposes of this Act, funeral services are any 
ceremony, procession, or memorial held in connection with the burial 
or cremation of a deceased person. 
Id.; see also Associated Press 16475, supra note 31.  The South Dakota legislature passed the 
law in only a couple of hours and included language that made it effective upon the 
Governor’s signature in order to cover upcoming funerals that week.  Associated Press 
16475, supra note 31. 
48 S.D. S. 156 (setting South Dakota’s distance restriction at 1,000 feet). 
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Missouri, the governor signed the state’s first protest ban in February 
2006, but later signed a second law, as a preventative measure, to get 
around any potential future lawsuits since the first ban did not specify a 
certain distance, making it susceptible to a possible vagueness 
challenge.49  Finally, Kentucky signed a law on March 27, 2006, that bans 
protestors within 300 feet of funerals, burial services, and memorial 
services.50 
To summarize the preceding sampling of legislation, distance 
requirements ranged from 100 feet in Nebraska, to 300 feet in Kansas, 
                                                 
49 Associated Press 16532, supra note 32. The newer ban expands the definition of a 
funeral to cover them no matter where they are held and sets a distance limit of 300 feet 
from funeral proceedings.  Id.  Otherwise, it is similar to the previous ban and has the same 
time limit of sixty minutes before and after a funeral.  Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501 
(West 2006). 
1.  This section shall be known as ‘Spc. Edward Lee Myers’ Law.’ 
2.  It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in picketing or other 
protest activities in front of or about any location at which a funeral is 
held, within one hour prior to the commencement of any funeral, and 
until one hour following the cessation of any funeral . . . . 
3.  For the purposes of this section, “funeral” means the ceremonies, 
processions and memorial services held in connection with the burial 
or cremation of the dead. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501; see also infra note 68 and accompanying text (likening the 
Missouri statute to those of Wisconsin, Ohio, and South Dakota). 
50 H.R. 333, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006), available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/ 
06rs/hb333.htm.  The statute, as of October 10, 2006, provided: 
(1)   A person is guilty of interference with a funeral when he or she at 
any time on any day: 
(a)   Blocks, impedes, inhibits, or in any other manner obstructs 
or interferes with access into or from any building or parking lot 
of a building in which a funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial 
is being conducted, or any burial plot or the parking lot of the 
cemetery in which a funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial is 
being conducted; 
(b)   Congregates, pickets, patrols, demonstrates, or enters on that 
portion of a public right-of-way or private property that is within 
three hundred (300) feet of an event specified in paragraph (a) of 
this subsection; or 
(c)  Without authorization from the family of the deceased or 
person conducting the service, during a funeral, wake, memorial 
service, or burial: 
1.  Sings, chants, whistles, shouts, yells, or uses a bullhorn, 
auto horn, sound amplification equipment, or other sounds 
or images observable to or within earshot of participants in 
the funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial; or 
2.  Distributes literature or any other item. 
Id.  Violation is a Class B misdemeanor.  Id.; see Hudson, supra note 3; Associated Press 
16414, supra note 24 (remarking on how Kentucky senators expedited the bill). 
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Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, and Kentucky, to 500 feet in Indiana and 
Wisconsin; and even to 1,000 feet in South Dakota.51  There were 
differences in time restrictions as well.52  For example, Kansas and 
Oklahoma restricted protesting one hour before and two hours after a 
funeral service, while Wisconsin, Ohio, South Dakota, and Missouri only 
restrict for one hour before and after.53  Unlike the common time 
restrictions in most states, Kentucky’s is an example of a ban with a 
vague time restriction, stating “at any time on any day.”54  Penalties 
range from violations constituting a misdemeanor, in Kansas, Maryland, 
and Kentucky, to a Class D felony in Indiana.55 
Beyond differences among the states, some states even differ from 
the Federal Heroes Act.56  Although the Federal Heroes Act is limited to 
military funerals because of jurisdiction issues, it can still serve as sample 
legislation for states that ban protests at all funerals.57  The Heroes Act 
distance requirement bans protestors 300 feet from a national cemetery 
or 150 feet from a route of ingress or egress to the cemetery.58  Its time 
restriction is one hour before to one hour after a funeral, memorial 
service, or ceremony.59  The penalty can be up to one year in prison, a 
fine, or both.60  Having compared and contrasted the bans, it is obvious 
that the states and their legislation are not uniform and that many even 
differ from the federal bill.61 
The lack of uniformity among state bans may be attributed to 
legislatures acting too quickly and it foreshadows the need for a model 
statute.62  One commentator stated, “[b]ut to see a news article one day 
and have a law enacted shortly thereafter makes it look as though little 
                                                 
51 See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text. 
52 See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text. 
53 See supra notes 34, 36, 40, 42, 44, 47, and 49 and accompanying text. 
54 See supra note 50.  The author believes this is a drafting weakness. 
55 Compare supra notes 33, 36, 42, 43, and 46-48 and accompanying text, with supra note 38 
and accompanying text (noting, for instance, that Oklahoma has a $500 fine or 30 days in 
jail and Maryland sets a $1,000 fine and 90 days in jail). 
56 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
57 Associated Press 16933, supra note 3. 
58 38 U.S.C. § 2413. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See supra notes 31-60 and accompanying text. 
62 Dean Mundy, Funeral Protest Law is Misguided, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 19, 2005, 
http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=408970 (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (arguing 
that legislators should wait before quickly enacting a law to see how big of a problem they 
are actually addressing). 
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thought or study are being done.”63  The constitutional issues that these 
laws raise may be taking a back seat to public policy concerns, but such 
issues will eventually rise to the surface through court challenges.64  Both 
WBC and the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) plan to 
challenge these laws.65 
In fact, Kentucky and Missouri are the first states to face 
constitutional challenges to their statutes in court.66  As previously 
stated, both states have distance requirements of 300 feet.67  Missouri 
restricts protesting for one hour before and after a funeral.68  However, 
Kentucky’s restriction is vaguer, stipulating “at any time on any day.”69  
In addition, Kentucky has a very broad and encompassing definition of 
                                                 
63 Id. 
64 Collins, supra note 3 (arguing that whether funeral protest bans violate the First 
Amendment is being overlooked in the recent trend of federal and state laws); STAR 
TRIBUNE, supra note 23.  Chuck Samuelson, executive director of the Minnesota American 
Civil Liberties Union stated, “[w]e generally don’t like these things and part of me says 
leave [him] alone and he’ll go away.  But this is not a constitutional issue, it’s a public 
policy issue.”  STAR TRIBUNE, supra note 23; see also Worldwide Religious News, Judge 
Temporarily Suspends Funeral Protest Ban, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.wwrn.org/ 
article.php?idd=22859&con=4&sec=36 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (describing how U.S. 
District Judge Karen Caldwell temporarily suspended Kentucky’s funeral protest ban, 
reasoning: “[t]he zone is large enough that it would restrict communications intended for 
the general public on a matter completely unrelated to the funeral as well as messages 
targeted at funeral participants.”). 
65 McDonough, supra note 24. 
66 The Associated Press, ACLU Lawsuit Challenges Kentucky Funeral-Protest Law, May 2, 
2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16841 (last visited Oct. 1, 
2007).  On May 1, 2006, the ACLU filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in 
Frankfort, Kentucky, challenging the new state law that prohibits protestors within 300 feet 
of funerals, memorial services, wakes, and burials, as well as preventing the use of 
bullhorns; punishable as disorderly conduct and up to a year in jail.  Id.; see Phelps-Roper v. 
Nixon, No. 06-4156-CV-C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2007) (involving a 
complaint against Missouri statute sections 578.501-502, of which section 578.502 is a 
backup that is to become effective if subsection 501 would be held unconstitutional, even 
though its only difference from the former version is that it changes “in front of or about” 
language to “three hundred feet”).  Phelps-Roper is claiming that the statutes infringe on 
individual speech, religious liberty, and assembly rights, arguing that they are 
unconstitutional, and is seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting 
enforcement of the statutes, citing a “lack of clarity about what speech is criminal” and 
complaining that the WBC is “chilled in their efforts to engage in protected speech 
activities inspired by their religious beliefs.”  Complaint at 2, Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 
06-4156-CV-C-NKL, 2007 WL 2515872 (W.D. Mo. July 21, 2006). 
67 Ky. H.R. 333, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501; see also supra 
note 51 and accompanying text (noting that other states that have 300 foot distance 
requirements include Kansas, Illinois, and Ohio). 
68 MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501; see also supra note 52 (noting other states that have time 
restrictions of one hour before and after, including Wisconsin, Ohio, and South Dakota). 
69 Ky. H.R. 333, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006). 
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picketing and protest activity.70  A court may find both of these vague 
sections within the Kentucky statute problematic.71  Although Missouri’s 
statute shares common threads with many other states, its legislature did 
anticipate problems, leading to the passage of its most recent statute with 
the 300 foot distance requirement as “backup” legislation in case the 
previous language of “in front of or about” would be held 
unconstitutionally vague.72  These constitutional challenges and 
legislative concerns require an overview of First Amendment doctrine. 
C. First Amendment Overview 
Funeral protest bans implicate the First Amendment by restricting 
speech.73  Although WBC and its tactics do not garner much public 
support, they may find all the support they need in the First 
Amendment.74  First Amendment analysis is always wary of the 
“slippery slope” when restricting speech.75  As Tony Rothert, an ACLU 
member stated, “[t]oday it’s a group we don’t like.  Tomorrow it could 
be us that [sic] are silenced.”76 
The First Amendment protects offensive and repugnant speech.77  
However, the First Amendment does not provide an absolute right to 
speech.78  First Amendment challenges can address whether a speech 
                                                 
70 Id.; see also infra note 168 (providing similar Texas code definitions). 
71 Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding a vague and overbroad 
anti-picketing ordinance unconstitutional).  See generally infra Part III.A.3 (providing 
analysis of overbreadth and vagueness doctrine). 
72 See supra note 66 (discussing Missouri’s backup legislation); Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 
No. 06-4156-CV-C-FJG, 2007 WL 273437, at *1, *4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2007) (noting plaintiff’s 
allegations that Missouri statute sections 578.501 and 578.502 infringe on speech, religious 
liberty, and assembly rights are targeted at WBC’s message, are vague, are not narrowly 
tailored, and convey information about time and routes that are not posted in a manner 
that allows for compliance). 
73 See generally supra notes 8 and 13 and accompanying text (providing constitutional 
arguments as well as the text of the First Amendment). 
74 STARTRIBUNE, supra note 23 (reporting on how the general public and hosts of a 
Minnesota radio show publicly condemned a recent WBC protest for hours on end); Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (stating: “The fact that the messages conveyed by those 
communications may be offensive to their recipients does not deprive them of 
constitutional protection.”). 
75 See generally Keen, supra note 22. 
76 Id. 
77 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that wearing a jacket that said “Fuck 
the Draft” in a courthouse to protest the Vietnam War was constitutional because offensive 
words are protected by the First Amendment). 
78 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (declaring that the freedom 
of speech and association are not “absolutes”); Collins, supra note 3 (holding that 
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restrictive law targets a certain group or content, argue that a restriction 
is not a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, facially challenge 
vague or overbroad terms, or try to characterize the forum.79 
Determining whether a speech restrictive law is content-based or 
content-neutral on its face sets the standard for analyzing the law.80  If a 
law is content-based, meaning the subject matter, message, or particular 
idea is restricted, it must satisfy strict scrutiny to survive a First 
Amendment challenge.81  Strict scrutiny requires a compelling 
government interest and narrowly tailored means.82  Strict scrutiny is a 
heavy burden to satisfy and typically requires that the regulation is 
necessary to achieve a compelling interest that cannot be achieved 
through any less intrusive means.83 
If a law is content-neutral, however, the government only has to 
meet intermediate scrutiny, which is a lesser burden and merely requires 
an important government interest and means that are no broader than 
necessary.84  Under intermediate scrutiny, the regulations must be 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest.85  Further, if a law is 
                                                                                                             
government can regulate noise, obstruction, disorderly conduct, trespassing, crowd size, 
threats, and fighting words, even in the funeral context). 
79 See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text; see also Part III.A (analyzing the 
constitutional strengths and weaknesses in current statutory and regulatory drafting). 
80 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding that if a restriction on speech is content-
based, it must meet strict scrutiny with a compelling government interest and narrowly 
tailored means); Hudson, supra note 3 (quoting Robert D. Richards’s statement: “Given that 
the expression at issue, ‘funeral protest,’ could easily be interpreted as a content-based 
restriction, the government will likely have a tough time defending the restriction.”). 
81 Turner Broad. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”).  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1054 (2d ed. 2005). 
82 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Barry, 485 U.S. at 312. 
83 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (it would be unlikely that 
the funeral protest bans, if content-based, would survive strict scrutiny).  But see Freeman 
v. Burson, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (upholding a content-based distance restriction around 
polling places because protecting the right to vote satisfied strict scrutiny). 
84 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989) (“So long as the means chosen 
are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest, however, 
the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s 
interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.”); 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1054.  Intermediate scrutiny requires an important 
government interest.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1054.  In order to be content-neutral, a 
speech regulation must be viewpoint neutral and subject matter neutral.  Id. at 1058. 
85 Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980) (stating that the 
level of scrutiny for time, place, and manner restrictions requires that alternative channels 
of communication are also left open). 
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content-neutral, government can limit speech with reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions, which would allow the government to 
regulate speech even in a public forum, such as the sidewalks and streets 
around a funeral or cemetery.86 
In addition, laws can be facially challenged because of their 
vagueness or substantial over-breadth.87  A law is unconstitutionally 
vague if it is ambiguous and a reasonable person cannot tell what speech 
is allowed or prohibited.88  Similarly, a law is unconstitutionally 
overbroad if it regulates substantially more speech than the Constitution 
allows and is unconstitutional when applied to others.89  If facial 
challenges such as these are successful, the entire law is invalidated.90 
Finally, since the type of forum where the speech takes place affects 
the level of scrutiny, it is necessary to examine the places where laws are 
trying to regulate speech.91  Public forums, such as sidewalks and parks, 
                                                 
86 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (holding that a statute regulating speech within 
one hundred feet of the entrance to any health care facility is a valid time, place, and 
manner regulation that is content-neutral, narrowly tailored, and leaves open alternative 
channels of communication); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) 
(holding that protestors could not sleep in the park); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 535-36; see also 
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (restricting noise and disruptions around schools 
in session); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (restricting sound devices on trucks); 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1356-57 (citing Hill, 530 U.S. 703, in which the Court upheld 
various regulations creating buffer zones around abortion clinics as reasonable time, place, 
and manner restrictions).  But see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).  In that case, 
the Court declared a speech restriction on the public sidewalks around the Supreme Court 
building unconstitutional because a total ban on speech was unnecessary to further the 
goal of preventing disruption of court proceedings.  Id. 
87 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (finding that an ordinance 
was overbroad because it prohibited all forms of live entertainment); Coates v. City of 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (holding that a particular ordinance was vague because 
there was an unascertainable standard and broad because it punished protected conduct 
and speech, making it facially invalid). 
88 Coates, 402 U.S. at 611; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1085. 
89 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1087. 
90 Id. at 1084. 
91 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 44 (1983); Dep’t of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92 (1972) (holding that government regulation of speech in public places must be 
content-neutral or else it has to meet strict scrutiny); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1342 
(“[T]here generally is no right to use private property for speech purposes . . . there is no 
state action, and the Constitution does not apply”); Phelps, supra note 3 (stating that courts 
first look at the location of the protestors); Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. 
L. REV. 581, 584 (2006) (referring to free speech, buffer, and protest zones used around 
abortion clinics, political conventions, campuses, and funerals).  “Governments have 
learned to manipulate geography in a manner that now seriously threatens basic First 
Amendment principles.”  Zick, supra. 
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are government property that the government must make available for 
speech.92  However, the government can still regulate speech in a public 
forum, as long as the regulation is content-neutral and is a reasonable 
time, place, and manner restriction.93 
D. Similar Speech Restrictions in Other Contexts 
Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, like the recent 
funeral protest bans, have been challenged in court in other contexts and 
thus are helpful to examine, since a court has yet to rule on the 
constitutionality of a funeral protest ban.94  Several Supreme Court 
abortion cases regarding buffer zones and restrictions around clinics 
provide helpful insight into how a court may analyze the 
constitutionality of funeral protest laws.95  These cases provide helpful 
tools to construct a model statute, by providing language, distance, and 
time restrictions that have been upheld and the Supreme Court 
reasoning behind its decisions.96 
In Hill v. Colorado,97 a 1993 Colorado law required protestors who 
were within one hundred feet of an abortion clinic to stay eight feet away 
from any person who was entering or exiting the clinic.98  The Court 
found that the statute was a content-neutral place regulation and upheld 
the law as constitutional.99  Similarly, in Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Center,100 the Court found that a thirty-six foot buffer zone in front of a 
clinic that prohibited any protest or demonstration was constitutional.101  
However, in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y.,102 the Court held 
that a fifteen foot “floating” buffer zone around any vehicle or person 
entering or leaving a clinic was unconstitutional.103  The Court reasoned 
                                                 
92 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (stating that public streets and sidewalks are 
traditional public forums). 
93 See infra Part II.D (discussing similar speech restrictions in other contexts). 
94 See infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text. 
95 See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 703; Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 
(1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Frisby, 487 U.S. 474. 
96 See infra Part IV (offering a model statute based on Part III’s analysis). 
97 Hill, 530 U.S. at 703. 
98 Id. (reasoning that the law was a valid time, place, and manner restriction and that it 
was narrowly tailored and allowed enough alternative channels of communication). 
99 Id. (reasoning that the right to access a health facility was an important interest). 
100 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753. 
101 Id. 
102 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 357 (1997). 
103 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997).  “We uphold the provisions imposing ‘fixed bubble’ or ‘fixed 
buffer zone’ limitations, as hereinafter described, but hold that the provisions imposing 
‘floating bubble’ or ‘floating buffer zone’ limitations violate the First Amendment.”  Id. at 
361. 
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that this was overbroad since it could apply to protestors on public 
sidewalks and curbs and would be very hard to enforce.104 
One final abortion case revolves around residential picketing.105  In 
Frisby v. Schultz, anti-abortion protestors targeted a doctor’s home and 
wanted to picket on the public street outside of his house.106  The Court 
held that the city ordinance restricting residential picketing was 
constitutional, despite lower courts’ holding and a strong dissent by 
several Justices.107  The Court relied heavily on the privacy of the home 
and the fact that the residents are “captive audiences” in their homes.108 
Although not as persuasive as the Supreme Court reasoning in the 
abortion context, two lower court cases from the 1990’s regarding 
picketing outside of churches are helpful for analyzing the recent funeral 
protest bans.109  In St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, 
a church filed a petition to stop WBC from picketing around its property 
before, during, and after religious events.110  The Kansas Court of 
Appeals affirmed a thirty-six foot buffer zone around the church to the 
east, west, and north and 215 feet to the south from thirty minutes before 
to thirty minutes after an event, reasoning that protecting a person’s 
place of worship is a legitimate government interest.111 
                                                 
104 Id. at 379 (“[W]e conclude that the floating buffer zones burden more speech than 
necessary to serve the relevant governmental interests.”). 
105 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
106 487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988).  The ordinance stated: “It is unlawful for any person to 
engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the 
Town of Brookfield.”  Id. at 477. 
107 Id. at 488.  The lower courts found that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored.  Id. at 
478.  However, the Supreme Court more narrowly interpreted the ordinance to only 
include a single house and not a whole residential area and also to only include those 
listeners who could not avoid the speech.  Id. at 482-88.  But see id. at 494 (Brennan, J. 
dissenting) (arguing that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored and the city could go 
back and change the ordinance to only regulate the “number of residential picketers, the 
hours during which a residential picket may take place, or the noise level of such a 
picket”). 
108 Id. at 487 (majority opinion).  “Because the picketing prohibited by the Brookfield 
ordinance is speech directed primarily at those who are presumptively unwilling to receive 
it, the State has a substantial and justifiable interest in banning it.”  Id. at 488. 
109 See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.  Since there has yet to be precedent 
directly on point drawing inferences, even from state and lower federal courts, provides 
some helpful information as to how courts may look at the recent funeral protest bans. 
110 St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, 22 Kan. App. 2d 537 (1996). 
111 Id. at 551-52.  St. David’s sued to stop picketing within thirty-six feet of the church to 
the east, west, and north and 215 feet to the south for thirty minutes before to thirty 
minutes after religious events like services, weddings, and funerals.  Id. at 540.  According 
to the Kansas Appellate Court, “the right of free exercise would be a hollow one if the 
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In contrast, in Olmer v. City of Lincoln,112 the Eighth Circuit held that a 
city ordinance restricting picketing outside religious places, with the 
same thirty-minute time restrictions as in St. David’s, was 
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored.113  The court 
found that the ordinance banned speech directed at adults and not just 
children (who were the city’s main interest when making the regulation) 
and prohibited more speech than just that speech that damaged 
children.114 
The different stances and reasoning of the Supreme Court on similar 
restrictions in the abortion context, as well as lower court reasoning in 
the religious context, leave legislatures unsure of how to draft valid 
legislation and whether or not their laws will withstand constitutional 
                                                                                                             
government could not step in to safeguard that right from unreasonable interference from 
another private party.”  Id. at 549. 
112 Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999). 
113 Id.  Here, anti-abortion picketers targeted an abortion doctor’s church, where he was a 
deacon, to protest his practices.  Id.  The city argued that their ordinance was a valid time, 
place, and manner restriction and relied on the interests of protecting children at church 
who were exposed to the picketing, preserving the right of citizens to practice their 
religion, and maintaining public safety.  Id. at 1180.  The ordinance defined picketing as: 
[T]he act of one or more persons stationing herself, himself or 
themselves outside religious premises on the exterior grounds, or on 
the sidewalks, streets or other part of the right of way in the immediate 
vicinity of religious premises, or moving in a repeated manner past or 
around religious premises, while displaying a banner, placard, sign or 
other demonstrative material as part of their expressive conduct. 
Id. at 1179 (quoting LINCOLN, NE. MUNI. CODE tit. 9, ch. 20, § 090(a)(3) (Sept. 21, 1998) 
(repealed)).  The ordinance further stated: 
It shall be deemed an unlawful disturbance of the peace for any person 
intentionally or knowingly to engage in focused picketing of a 
scheduled religious activity at any time within the period from one-
half hour before to one-half hour after the scheduled activity, at any 
place: 
(1) on the religious organization’s exterior premises, 
including its parking lots; or 
(2) on the portion of the right of way including any sidewalk 
on the same side of the street and adjoining the boundary of 
the religious premises, including its parking lots; or 
(3) on the portion of the right of way adjoining the boundary 
of the religious premises which is a street or roadway 
including any median within such street or roadway. 
Id. (quoting LINCOLN, NE. MUNI. CODE tit. 9, ch. 20, § 090(a)(3) (Sept. 21, 1998) (repealed)). 
114 Id. at 1180 (“The ordinance purports to make the carrying of signs at the indicated 
times and places unlawful, no matter what the signs say or depict, and this prohibition is 
much broader than necessary . . . .”). 
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challenges, thus demonstrating the need for a model statute.115  State 
funeral protest bans are designed to balance the competing rights 
between protestors and mourners.116  The First Amendment protects 
speech, and precedent in other contexts sheds light on how such 
legislation should be drafted in order to survive future court 
challenges.117  The strengths and weaknesses in the drafting of current 
bans are analyzed below.118 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Part III applies the background information to determine whether 
the state funeral protest bans violate the First Amendment rights of 
protestors and what the proper balance of rights should be in current 
and future legislation.119  First, this Part analyzes the constitutionality of 
the bans by discussing content-neutrality, reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions, vagueness and overbreadth, and forum.120  Then, it 
exposes the strengths and weaknesses of the funeral protest bans by 
drawing on similar restrictions in other contexts.121 
A. Are State Funeral Protest Bans Constitutional? 
Recently passed state funeral protest bans implicate several 
constitutional concerns, including: content-neutrality, vagueness and 
overbreadth, and the scope of reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions.  Although the bans have similar features, components, and 
drafting (each include items such as distance buffer zones, time 
restrictions, and penalties), the lack of uniformity among those features 
                                                 
115 See supra Part II.D.  Compare Hill (530 U.S. 703), and Madsen (512 U.S. 753) (upholding 
the constitutionality of protest restrictions at one hundred feet, thirty-six feet, and an eight 
foot buffer zone), with Schenck (519 U.S. at 377, 379), and Olmer (192 F.3d at 1180) (declaring 
a fifteen-foot floating buffer zone unconstitutional and holding a restriction too broad since 
it regulated all forms of speech).  See infra Part III.B (comparing state bans to the speech-
restrictive bans from other contexts). 
116 See supra Part II.B (providing a discussion of state bans and the reasons behind their 
enactments). 
117 See supra Parts II.C and II.D (discussing First Amendment analysis and case law in 
other precedents). 
118 See infra Part III (analyzing the constitutionality of state funeral protest bans). 
119 See infra Parts III and IV (analyzing the constitutionality of the laws and providing a 
model statute). 
120 See infra Part III.A (discussing the constitutionality of the bans by analyzing whether 
the bans are content-neutral, set reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and are 
not over-broad or vague). 
121 See infra Part III.B (comparing the drafting in state bans to the speech-restrictive bans 
from other contexts). 
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and components may be problematic.122  Since the legislation passed, 
roughly at the same time in many states and with little court precedent 
to guide the legislatures, the lack of uniformity may cause some states 
that exhibited poor drafting or more extreme measures to worry more 
about their statute’s constitutionality.123  As precedent in other contexts 
has highlighted, when restrictions are not carefully drafted or are too 
extreme, they often are found unconstitutional.124 
1. State Funeral Protest Bans Must Be Content-Neutral 
In order for state funeral protest bans to survive constitutional 
challenges, they must be content-neutral.125  A content-neutral regulation 
does not discriminate against or target specific speech and is viewpoint 
and subject matter neutral.126  Despite generally having to meet a less 
stringent standard, it is important for a state funeral protest ban to be 
content-neutral since it would be unlikely for a court to find that such a 
ban satisfied strict scrutiny if it was content-based.127 
Paying some attention to the legislative intent behind these funeral 
protest bans is helpful to the analysis as well.128  In particular, it is 
necessary to determine whether the bans were created and directed 
toward WBC and its message, or rather to protect funerals in general 
from all protestors and demonstrations.129  The intent may impact 
                                                 
122 See generally supra Part II.B (discussing current state funeral protest bans); see also 
Hudson, supra note 3 (noting that the following states have passed legislation: Alabama, 
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia and Wisconsin). 
123 See supra notes 45-50 and 62-66 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 34 and 40-43 and accompanying text; see also Part II.D (discussing 
similar speech restrictions in other protest contexts). 
125 See supra Part II.C; see also supra notes 73-93 (laying the foundation for a First 
Amendment analysis). 
126 See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.  See generally Part II.C (providing a First 
Amendment overview). 
127 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.  See generally Part II.C (First Amendment 
analysis framework). 
128 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.  See generally Part II.C (setting a First 
Amendment analysis framework). 
129 See supra note 8; Associated Press 16414, supra note 24.  WBC leader Fred Phelps told 
the Kansas Senate Federal and State Affairs Committee, “[w]e can’t be lawfully moved out 
of sight of our target audience. . . . You have no legitimate public interest here.”  Associated 
Press 16414, supra note 24. 
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whether courts view the legislation as content-based.130  For example, 
Governor Tom Vilsack of Iowa plainly stated, in regard to WBC, “[t]hese 
protestors don’t reflect Iowa values, and their actions have no place in 
our state.”131  Similarly, Kentucky stated in its statute that disrupting 
military funerals was disgraceful and even warranted a declaration of 
emergency.132  Despite arguments that the recent legislation targets the 
WBC and its message, certain members of the U.S. Supreme Court have 
stated that legislative intent is not determinative of whether a law is 
content-neutral on its face.133  Although some of the bans were passed 
unusually quickly in anticipation of an upcoming WBC protest, making 
it easy to question the legislative intent, they have all been facially 
content-neutral.134  Content-neutrality is key to any model statute, as it 
allows for a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.135 
Although the impetus behind much, if not all, of the legislation has 
been caused by WBC’s conduct of protesting funerals, and many 
legislators and citizens have opposed WBC’s acts and message, courts 
                                                 
130 David L. Hudson, Jr., Pastor’s Anti-Gay Actions Test Society’s Commitment to First 
Amendment, Oct. 16, 1998, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=9482 
[hereinafter Hudson II] (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (describing how Tom McCoy, Vanderbilt 
law professor, stated at the time that WBC should have the right to express their message 
and that it was a form of political speech, despite general public feeling that a funeral is not 
an appropriate place).  But see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (noting that the law 
was found content-neutral regardless of the triggering event).  “Whether or not those 
interests justify the particular regulation at issue, they are unquestionably legitimate.”  Id. 
131 Associated Press, supra note 32; see STARTRIBUNE, supra note 23 (stating that Minnesota 
representative Seifert said that the WBC demonstrations were against Minnesota values). 
132 Ky. H.R. 333.  “Whereas there is a disgraceful nationwide campaign to disrupt 
military funerals, and whereas this campaign may enter Kentucky at any time, an 
emergency is declared to exist, and this Act takes effect upon its passage and approval by 
the Governor or upon its otherwise becoming a law.”  Id. at § 6. 
133 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To look for the 
sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not 
exist.”) (emphasis in original); see also Chen, supra note 29 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly 
rejected direct judicial inquiries into legislative motive, even where there is substantial 
evidence that a facially neutral law might have been adopted for speech-restrictive 
reasons.”).  But see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
(noting that, because the object of these ordinances was to suppress only one religion, the 
laws were struck down by the Court despite their neutrality); Collins, supra note 3 (stating 
that it is viewpoint-discrimination if the stated or actual purpose of the laws is to prohibit 
groups like the Westboro Baptist Church, but not Patriot Guard Riders); Associated Press 
16301, supra note 7 (citing Geoffrey Stone from University of Chicago Law School as saying 
the Illinois law is unconstitutional because it is directed at the content of the speech and 
singles out certain protests). 
134 See Mundy, supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the speed with which 
many of these bans were enacted). 
135 See infra Part IV (providing a model statute). 
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generally look only to the statutory text to determine content-
neutrality.136  Since most of the statutes prohibit all protesting and 
demonstrations, creating a general ban, they will likely be determined to 
be content-neutral.137  Nevertheless, the content-neutrality of these 
funeral protest bans is still being questioned.138  In addition, any state 
that allows some forms of demonstrations (like those of the Patriot 
Guard Riders), but not others (like WBC demonstrations), will have a 
hard time convincing a court that its regulation is content-neutral and an 
even harder time convincing that same court that its statute meets strict 
scrutiny.139 
The majority of the funeral protest bans are content-neutral.140  
Beginning with the Respect for Fallen Heroes Act, their terms do not 
distinguish among different types of demonstrations and apply to all 
protestors no matter what their message may be.141  However, even the 
Fallen Heroes Act has a drafting weakness regarding content-
neutrality.142  It states that no demonstrations can be carried out 
according to the various regulations “unless the demonstration has been 
approved,” and yet presents no guidelines on approval.143  This may lead 
to some content-based decisions in the future and is a drafting weakness 
that should be avoided by the states.144  Not taking after the weaknesses 
in the federal Act, all of the states sampled in this Note used content-
                                                 
136 See supra Part II.A (discussing the WBC and its tactics); see also supra Part II.C 
(providing the framework for content-neutral regulations); supra note 123 and 
accompanying text. 
137 Phelps, supra note 3, at 290. 
138 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 767 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“By confining the 
law’s application to the specific locations where the prohibited discourse occurs, the State 
has made a content-based determination.”); see also Hudson, supra note 3 (noting Richards’ 
statement, “[t]he other question I would have is what would happen if people who loved 
the deceased held up signs outside the church or funeral home saying, ‘We love you.  We’ll 
miss you’ . . . Would those folks face criminal charges?  If not, there’s a viewpoint-based 
discrimination issue.”). 
139 See Hudson, supra note 3 (stating that protection for a “grieving family” is not a 
compelling government interest).  But see Phelps, supra note 3, at 290 (stating that 
protecting the right to worship is an important government interest).  See generally supra 
Part II.C. 
140 See supra Part II.B (providing a sampling of current state funeral protest bans). 
141 See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. 
142 See infra notes 144-45 (showing drafting weaknesses in the Fallen Heroes Act). 
143 See 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (“No person may carry out – (1) a demonstration on the property 
of a cemetery under the control of the National Cemetery Administration . . . unless the 
demonstration has been approved by the cemetery superintendent or the director of the 
property on which the cemetery is located.”). 
144 See infra Part IV (providing a model statute based on analyzing strengths and 
weaknesses in drafting). 
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neutral language like “any person” or “any demonstration.”145  Content-
neutrality is the first requirement in surviving a constitutional challenge, 
and it seems as if most states have taken that first step correctly so as not 
to cause a drafting weakness.146 
2. Bans Must Be Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 
Crafting a content-neutral funeral protest ban that is a reasonable 
time, place, and manner restriction is the best way to survive 
constitutional scrutiny.147  A reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction must be content-neutral, advance a substantial government 
interest, be narrowly tailored, and leave open alternative channels of 
communication.148  A reasonable time, place, and manner status is 
important, as courts overwhelmingly uphold such restrictions.149 
State funeral protest bans can still be challenged under reasonable 
time, place, and manner restriction analysis.150  For example, a statute 
that is not narrowly tailored may fail this analysis.151  States like South 
Dakota, with extreme distance requirements like 1,000 feet, or Kentucky, 
which arguably regulates too much conduct, such as distributing 
literature, may fail a narrowly tailored analysis because of these drafting 
weaknesses.152  In addition, if a protest ban is not effective (either 
because privacy rights are compromised or more speech than necessary 
is restricted), it can be argued that its means do not meet its goals and, 
                                                 
145 See supra Part II.B (listing relevant state legislation). 
146 See supra Part II.B (noting that Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Nebraska, Maryland, 
Missouri and Ohio are examples of states using content-neutral language like “no person,” 
“no demonstration,” and “no protest”); Wis. S. 525 (“No person . . . .”); Ohio H.R. 484 
(“[N]o person shall picket or engage in protest activities . . . .”).  However, some statutes 
focus more on the intent to disrupt.  See, e.g., N.J. A2870 and N.C. S. 1833 (allowing an 
argument that non-disruptive supportive demonstrations would be excluded from the 
bans).  See Chen, supra note 29, at 46-47 (“If lawmakers wish to regulate a particular type of 
constitutionally protected speech or speech-related conduct, they cannot openly identify 
the object of their concern in the statute’s language.”). 
147 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.C; supra note 83. 
148 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
149 See generally supra Part II.C (discussing First Amendment analysis about content-
neutrality).  But see Collins, supra note 134 (holding that reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions cannot be used because these restrictions discriminate on the content of the 
message, and there is viewpoint-discrimination if the stated or actual purpose of the laws is 
to prohibit groups like Westboro Baptist Church but not others like the Patriot Guard 
Riders). 
150 See supra Parts II.D-III.B (looking at how courts have judged reasonable time, place, 
and manner restrictions in other contexts). 
151 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra notes 47, 50 (highlighting South Dakota and Kentucky statutes). 
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therefore, that it does not constitute a reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction.153  It will be important to courts in the future whether or not a 
ban has been successful at eliminating the harm caused by WBC’s 
funeral protests or, rather, if the ban inhibited WBC’s speech with no 
benefits coming from the regulation.154  Finally, if a protest ban does not 
leave open alternative channels of communication, it cannot be 
considered a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.155  
Therefore, the statutes that encompass more activities under their 
definitions of protest or picketing are more at risk, since they allow fewer 
alternatives and may even run the risk of being considered overbroad.156  
All of these examples highlight the importance of careful drafting that is 
required to create a constitutional funeral protest ban.157 
3. Bans Cannot Be Overbroad or Vague 
A speech regulation that is overbroad or vague can be challenged on 
its face; if such a challenge is successful, the entire law is invalid.158  
Thus, a state funeral protest ban must be narrow in scope and must 
contain clear definitions and language so as not to be ruled 
unconstitutionally vague.159  Unfortunately, balancing overbreadth and 
content-neutrality when drafting legislation is very difficult.160 
Since most of the protest bans prohibit any kind of speech or 
demonstration at funerals, even positive forms of each, it can be argued 
that the laws are too broad to survive constitutional scrutiny.161  For 
example, demonstrations by the Patriot Guard Riders are not disruptive 
and do not cause harm to grieving families, but they are still prohibited 
                                                 
153 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
154 Associated Press 16779, supra note 32 (noting that a member of WBC told the Des 
Moines Register that they would still come to Iowa, despite the law, but would honor the 
distance requirements). 
155 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
156 See Ky. H.R. 333, supra note 50; see also infra notes 160-69; infra Part III.A.3 (discussing 
overbreadth and vagueness weaknesses). 
157 See infra Part IV (proposing a model statute based on drafting strengths and 
weaknesses discussed). 
158 See supra Part II.C (laying the foundation for a First Amendment analysis). 
159 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing vagueness weaknesses in drafting). 
160 Chen, supra note 29, at 65. 
161 Associated Press 16064, supra note 35 (explaining why Ronald K.L. Collins, a First 
Amendment Center scholar in Virginia, believes it will be hard to apply a law in a content-
neutral way without restricting those who want to show respect for the dead); Collins, 
supra note 3 (stating that now you cannot be angry at or protest any dead person, even 
people like Lee Harvey Oswald or John Wilkes Booth).  This author suggests that perhaps 
the decedents’ families be allowed to invite whomever they want. 
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by the statutes.162  This example illustrates the problem of crafting a 
protest ban that makes clear what types of protests are unlawful and the 
side effects of prohibiting typically welcomed speech due to its 
breadth.163  However, to attain content-neutrality, a level of broadness is 
necessary.164  The statute’s constitutionality will ultimately depend on 
how a court draws that line between content-neutrality and over-
breadth. 
Several state funeral protest bans have shown constitutional 
weakness in the context of vagueness or over-breadth problems.165  For 
example, Kansas’ original statute was deemed unconstitutionally vague 
because of its time restrictions “before or after,” but recently the Kansas 
legislature changed its statute to specify a time period from one hour 
before to two hours after.166  Similarly, Missouri passed a second funeral 
protest ban that changed the language “in front of or about” to 300 feet, 
in fear of having its statute declared unconstitutionally vague.167  
Kentucky’s vague time restriction prohibiting protests “at any time of 
the day” and its far-reaching definition of protest activity may cause 
vagueness and over-breadth problems in any upcoming lawsuits.168  
Finally, South Dakota’s 1,000 foot distance restriction is in danger of 
being held unconstitutionally overbroad, because it encompasses such a 
large area and may regulate more speech than the Constitution allows.169  
States with clear time restrictions will likely avoid this vagueness 
problem.170 
In contrast, Florida’s ban is brief and vague, including language such 
as “interrupts.”171  Florida is unique in that most of the other statutes 
                                                 
162 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing Patriot Guard Riders).  See 
generally notes 34-55 and accompanying text (revealing how various states’ laws prohibit 
both friends and foes). 
163 Collins, supra note 134 (statutes need to make clear what types of messages are 
considered unlawful protest). 
164 See supra Part III.B.3 (explaining how content-neutral regulations can be broad and 
vague). 
165 Kan. S. 421; MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501; see also supra notes 110-11. 
166 Kan. S. 421. 
167 See supra notes 66-68 and 72. 
168 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
169 McDonough, supra note 24, at 16 (commenting on how UCLA law professor Eugene 
Volokh believes that principles underlying bans on picketing private residences could be 
applied to funerals, but excessive distance requirements, which he believes regulate more 
than 100 feet, would probably be unconstitutional); S.D. S. 156. 
170 See supra notes 34-55 (providing examples of various state time restrictions). 
171 Fla. H.R. 7127, supra note 46 and accompanying text (showing the bill’s vague distance 
language). 
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have clearly defined terms and distance and time requirements.172  For 
example, Texas’ statute successfully avoids vagueness by clearly 
defining every term.173  A model statute should define every term 
succinctly and avoid vague language like that in Florida’s statute.174 
Definitions are easy targets for findings of vague or overbroad 
language because funeral protest bans differ in their definitions and 
often have unique clauses.175  For instance, various definitions of the 
word “funeral” exist.176  Kansas defines a “funeral” as any “ceremony, 
procession or memorial service in connection with the death of a 
person.”177  Indiana restricts protests for a funeral, procession, burial, or 
viewing.178  Illinois includes any facility used for funeral services.179  
Missouri extends the restriction to any place in which a funeral is held.180 
                                                 
172 See supra Part II.B (providing a sampling of current state legislation). 
173 H.R. 97, 2006 Leg. (Tex. 2006), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/793/billtext/ 
pdf/HB00097F.pdf.  The definitions include: 
(1)  “Facility” means a building at which any portion of a funeral 
service takes place, including a funeral parlor, mortuary, private 
home, or established place of worship. 
(2)  “Funeral service” means a ceremony, procession, or memorial 
service, including a wake or viewing, held in connection with the 
burial or cremation of the dead. 
(3)  “Picketing” means: 
(A)  standing, sitting, or repeated walking, riding, driving, or other 
similar action by a person displaying or carrying a banner, placard, or 
sign; 
(B)  engaging in loud singing, chanting, whistling, or yelling, with or 
without noise amplification through a device such as a bullhorn or 
microphone; or 
(C)  blocking access to a facility or cemetery being used for a funeral 
service. 
(b)  A person commits an offense if, during the period beginning one 
hour before the service begins and ending one hour after the service is 
completed, the person engages in picketing within 500 feet of a facility 
or cemetery being used for a funeral service. 
Id. 
174 See supra Part IV (providing a model statute). 
175 See supra notes 34-72, 160-68 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra notes 34-72, 160-68 and accompanying text. 
177 Kan. S. 421. 
178 See IND. CODE § 35-45-1-3. 
179 See Ill. Pub. Act 094-0772; see also Wis. S. 525  (defining funeral or memorial service as 
a wake or burial, but excluding services that are “not intended to honor or commemorate 
one or more specific decedents”). 
180 See MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501 (defining funeral as the “ceremonies, processions and 
memorial services held in connection with the burial or cremation of the dead”). 
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“Protest” or “picketing” are also defined differently by the states.181  
For example, Kansas defines picketing as “protest activities engaged in 
by a person or persons stationed before or about a cemetery, mortuary, 
church, or other location where a funeral is held or conducted.”182  Ohio 
defines protest activities as “any action that is disruptive or undertaken 
to disrupt or disturb a funeral or burial service or a funeral 
procession.”183  Kentucky restricted even more activities, such as singing, 
distributing literature, and interfering with access to a funeral.184  As 
these examples illustrate, some statutes are more detailed than others, 
have stricter restrictions than others, and ultimately may present more 
constitutional concerns than others.185  A model statute needs to clearly 
define its terms and avoid vague or overbroad language when providing 
definitions. 
4. Public vs. Private Forums 
Sidewalks and streets have traditionally been held to be public 
forums.186  Although most funerals take place on private property, 
protestors who have used public sidewalks and streets to voice their 
messages are now being regulated in those public places.187  In effect, 
state funeral protest bans have regulated speech on public property.188  
This raises a constitutional concern, since: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they 
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.  Such use of 
the streets and public places has, from ancient times, 
been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and 
liberties of citizens.189 
                                                 
181 See supra notes 165, 167-68 and accompanying text. 
182 Kan. S. 421. 
183 Ohio H.R. 484. 
184 Ky. H.R. 333. 
185 Compare Fla. H.R. 7127, with other statutes in Part II.B, supra. 
186 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000).  Said the Court, “[T]he public sidewalks, 
streets, and ways affected by the statute are ‘quintessential’ public forums for free speech.”  
Id. 
187 See generally supra Part II.A; Hudson, supra note 3 (arguing that sidewalks and streets 
around funeral homes and churches are public and restricting speech on public space must 
have a compelling interest that is lacking here). 
188 See generally supra Part II.B (sampling current state legislation). 
189 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
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Even so, government can still regulate speech in public forums, provided 
the regulation is content-neutral and a reasonable time, place, and 
manner restriction.190  Furthermore, recent case precedent suggests that 
most government-owned properties will be considered non-public 
forums.191  Government can regulate or even prohibit all speech in non-
public forums as long as the regulation is viewpoint neutral and 
reasonable.192  Therefore, it is possible to regulate speech activities in any 
of the areas that the funeral bans encompass, whether or not they are 
characterized as public forums or non-public forums, so long as the bans 
are carefully and constitutionally crafted.193 
As previously mentioned, a ban must be content-neutral, be a 
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, and not be vague or 
overbroad.194  A state funeral protest ban that meets all of these 
requirements has the best chance of surviving First Amendment 
challenges.195  In order to illustrate the importance of these requirements 
in drafting, the Note will next analyze similar speech restrictions in other 
protest contexts.196 
B. How Do These Funeral Protest Bans Compare To Similar Protest 
Restrictions in Other Contexts? 
Constitutional challenges to funeral protest bans are in their earliest 
stages; thus, comparing these bans to similar protest restrictions in other 
contexts will be helpful to this analysis and to predicting 
constitutionality.197  As previously mentioned, several abortion, 
                                                 
190 See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. 
191 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1375 (“Unfortunately, especially as applied in recent 
cases like Kokinda, Lee, and Forbes, it will be very difficult to find that any government 
property is a public or limited public forum.”). But see Zick, supra note 91, at 581 (arguing 
that recent First Amendment analysis concentrates on the speech that is being regulated 
and often pays little or no attention to the place, allowing place to become a “powerful 
weapon of social and political control”). 
192 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1361. 
193 Compare supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text, with Phelps, supra note 3 
(explaining how restricting public areas near churches may raise concerns about the 
separation of church and state). 
194 See supra Parts III.A.1-3 and accompanying text. 
195 See infra Part IV (offering a model statute). 
196 See infra Part III.B (discussing court reasoning from speech restrictions in other 
contexts). 
197 See Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06-4156-CV-C-FJG, 2007 WL 273473 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 
2007); supra notes 66, 72 (involving a complaint alleging that Missouri statute sections 
578.501 and 578.502 infringe on individual speech, religious liberty, and assembly rights); 
Snyder v. Phelps, No. RDB-06-1389, 2006 WL 3081106 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2006); supra notes 24, 
29; Brian Goodman, Funeral Picketers Sued By Marine’s Dad, CBS News, July 28, 2006, 
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residential picketing, and church-related cases dealing with time, place, 
and manner restrictions on speech in public forums shed light on what a 
court looks for, what restrictions it has declared unconstitutional, and 
why.198  Unfortunately, determining whether a regulation is reasonable is 
very contextual.199  Therefore, looking at the results and reasoning of 
similar cases may help in crafting a constitutional funeral protest ban.200 
In Hill v. Colorado, the Supreme Court upheld a statute regulating 
speech within one hundred feet of an abortion clinic, as well as an eight-
foot buffer zone surrounding individuals entering and leaving the clinic 
as a valid time, place, and manner restriction.201  In its reasoning, the 
Court found the regulation to be content-neutral and stressed that the 
statute placed no limitations on the number of speakers, the noise level, 
or the number, size, or text of images on the placards used by the 
protestors.202  In addition, the Court acknowledged that the statute 
required protestors to approach someone knowingly in order for a 
violation to be upheld.203  However, it can be argued that funeral protest 
laws are different from the sort of buffer zones created in Hill because 
the former do not involve a right to access to health services and there is 
no constitutional right to have a public funeral without protests.204  
Additionally, the distance requirements were much lower in Hill than in 
many state funeral protest bans.205  Despite that argument, Hill provides 
an excellent roadmap for drafting a constitutional time, place, and 
manner speech restriction.206 
                                                                                                             
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07/27/national/printable1843396.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2006) (explaining that Albert Snyder filed a lawsuit that claims WBC violated 
his privacy, defamed him, and intentionally inflicted emotional distress when it targeted 
his marine son’s funeral). 
198 See supra Part II.D (discussing similar protest restrictions in other contexts). 
199 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at 1357 (“Looked at together, all of these cases indicate 
that the determination of whether a regulation is a reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction is entirely contextual.”). 
200 See supra Part IV (laying out a model statute). 
201 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-20 (2000); supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
202 Hill, 530 U.S. at 726-27. The Court acknowledged that the statute applied to “all” 
forms of protesting, counseling, and demonstrators whether or not they concerned abortion 
or supported a certain stance.  Id. at 726. 
203 Id. at 720. 
204 Id. 
205 Collins, supra note 3.  However, shorter distances also pose problems because privacy 
is an important countervailing liberty interest to First Amendment freedoms.  Id. 
206 See supra Part IV (setting forth a model statute based in part on the reasoning in Hill). 
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Other reasoning used in the cases previously examined may also be 
distinguished.207  For instance, laws banning residential picketing are 
arguably not applicable because the home is not involved in funeral 
protest bans.208  Based on that sort of reasoning, it will be difficult to use 
Frisby’s “captive audience” approach for support in defending a funeral 
ban court challenge.209  In addition, it may be hard to apply the 
secondary effects doctrine to state funeral protest bans as the Eighth 
Circuit court did with the Olmer ordinance.210 
The remaining cases previously discussed also shed light on how to 
craft a model statute.211  Madsen and Schenck both serve as examples that 
buffer zones will likely be upheld if they are a reasonable distance, such 
as less than one hundred feet, and they are not floating.212  These cases 
shed light on the issue by allowing us to see how the Court has analyzed 
such content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions against 
protestors.213 
Finally, St. David’s and Olmer prove to be valuable examples 
concerning churches and protestors.214  In St. David’s, a court upheld a 
buffer zone against protestors around the church for thirty minutes 
before and after services because the court recognized that citizens have 
an interest in practicing their faith without interruptions.215  In Olmer, on 
the other hand, the court struck down a very similar ordinance because it 
prohibited more speech than was necessary in achieving its goal of 
protecting children.216  Both of these examples show that a model statute 
needs to make sure to convey the state’s interests clearly and be 
narrowly tailored and crafted so as not to prohibit more speech than 
                                                 
207 See supra Part II.D (noting similar restrictions in other protest contexts). 
208 Collins, supra note 3 (stating also that even absolute bans involving the home are 
sometimes not upheld). 
209 See supra notes 81-83, 161 and accompanying text; cf. Phelps, supra note 3, at 300-01 
(describing how it may be possible to apply the Frisby “captive audience” test to churches, 
because another court could find enough similarities, including that both are services 
taking place at specific times and days requiring people to be there); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 
U.S. 474 (1988); supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. 
210 Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999); supra notes 109-10 and 
accompanying text; supra Part II.D; see also Phelps, supra note 3, at 307. 
211 See supra Part II.D (providing an overview of speech restrictive bans in other protest 
contexts). 
212 See supra notes 95, 99-101 and accompanying text; cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 
(2000) (upholding an eight-foot floating buffer zone). 
213 See infra Part IV (using this analysis in creating a model statute). 
214 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
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necessary when regulating funeral protests.217  The foregoing analysis of 
restrictions in other contexts sheds light on how to best craft a 
constitutional funeral protest ban.218 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Despite the importance of First Amendment political speech rights, 
state bans have been favoring the privacy rights of the deceased and 
their families in the context of funeral settings.219  As these funeral bans 
continue to differ and are eventually challenged in court, the sensitivity 
attached to First Amendment speech rights will require a careful crafting 
of such restrictions and bans if they are to stand up to constitutional 
challenges.220  This Part will address whether striking a certain balance of 
rights or certain phrasing in a model statute can make legislation more 
likely to withstand future court challenges.  In order to test constitutional 
challenges, a model statute based off of comparing current legislation 
                                                 
217 See infra Part IV (providing a model statute). 
218 See supra Parts II.B, III.D; see also Carrie L. Johnson, Comment, Unwanted Speech and the 
State’s Interest in Protecting Religious Free Exercise: Drawing First Amendment Lines in Olmer 
v. City of Lincoln, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 471 (2001).  Johnson states: 
To follow Hill, the Lincoln City Council would draft its ordinance to 
make it unlawful for one individual to approach within eight feet of 
another individual without their consent for purposes of oral protest, 
education, counseling, or leaflet passing when within one hundred feet 
of a building used for religious purposes.  To make the ordinance more 
narrowly tailored to its interest, the Lincoln City Council could follow 
its previous model and ban such activities only during “scheduled 
religious activities.” 
Johnson, supra; see also Phelps, supra note 3, at 310-12 (1999) (arguing that to construct a 
valid ban on church picketing, the best interests are protecting children, as in Olmer, or 
protecting religious privacy, as long as it does not violate the Establishment Clause, that 
ample alternative communication channels should not be a problem; that narrow tailoring 
is the hardest requirement to meet, and that, as said by the dissent in Frisby, coercive 
aspects of picketing bans should be eliminated, including regulations on group numbers, 
noise levels, and hours as opposed to the government being inactive or overbroad). 
219 See supra Part II.B (discussing current state funeral protest bans); see also Phelps, supra 
note 3, at 288-89 (“The Court is troubled by the notion that a person may be subjected to 
focused picketing at their place of worship.  Indeed, the right to engage in quiet and 
reflective prayer without being subjected to unwarranted intrusion is an essential 
component to freedom of religion.”); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715-16 (“It is also 
important when conducting this interest analysis to recognize the significant difference 
between state restrictions on a speaker’s right to address a willing audience and those that 
protect listeners from unwanted communication.”). 
220 Hudson II, supra note 125 (citing McCoy, who believes that reasonable time, place and 
manner restrictions to protect privacy rights, if applied neutrally, would likely survive 
constitutional challenges and who also stated, “[t]he true test of free speech is whether we 
tolerate political ideas which we all consider offensive.  I mean, the ideas which we agree 
on do not need protection.”). 
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and protesting precedents from other contexts needs to be addressed and 
laid out.  The model statute consists of compiling strongly drafted 
sections of current state legislation (those sections that are likely to 
survive a court challenge), and then further enhances those sections to 
create a constitutional funeral protest ban. 
A. Components of a Model Statute 
A model funeral protest ban must be content-neutral, a reasonable 
time, place, and manner restriction, neither vague nor overbroad in its 
terms or what activity it encompasses, limited to public places, leave 
open alternative channels of communication, and draw upon the rulings 
of the courts in the abortion, residential picketing, and prior church-
related rulings.  The model statute cannot target the WBC or any other 
similar group on its face.  If it did specifically enumerate groups, the 
statute would be subject to heightened scrutiny and would likely fail 
strict scrutiny.  Similarly, if not equally enforced among all those who 
disturb a funeral, whether it is the WBC or Patriot Guard Riders, 
challengers may argue that the legislative purpose is in fact 
discriminatory.  To be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, 
the model statute must not only be content-neutral but also have clear 
time and distance restrictions.  The more extreme time and distance 
restrictions are, the less constitutional they will be.221 
Finally, if terms are unclear or the statute is crafted too broadly, it 
will likely fail a court challenge.  A model statute should keep its 
distance requirements to 300 feet or less, its time restrictions as closely 
related to the time of the service as possible, and clearly provide 
timeframes quantitatively, while prohibiting only as much speech as 
necessary to preserve the privacy and sanctity of the service.  As the 
Kentucky and Missouri statutes face court challenges already, it is clear 
that using language describing the time restrictions as “any time” 
instead of setting a concrete amount or having backup legislation in 
anticipation of a constitutional violation will place a target on a state’s 
funeral protest ban.222 
                                                 
221 See S.D. S. 156, at § 3 (describing South Dakota’s 1,000 foot restriction); Fla. H.R. 7127 
(providing only vague language about distance); Collins, supra note 3 (arguing that a 
greater distance lessens the effectiveness of protests). 
222 See Ky. H.R. 333. 
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B. Model Statute 
The Model Statute will borrow from only the most strongly drafted 
sections of legislation previously discussed and will further amend and 
enhance them.  To start, the Model Statute would benefit from a very 
clear and concise purpose statement, much like the one in Oklahoma’s 
statute.  Next, the conduct prohibited at funerals needs to be clearly 
defined and given a time restriction.  Kentucky’s statute does a thorough 
job of this and is the best model.  Also, clear distance and time 
restrictions need to be set.  Illinois sets a distance requirement of 200 feet 
and is overtly clear about which and from where services are protected 
within this buffer zone, making its statute an appropriate model.  
Finally, penalties for violating such a statute need to be given.  The 
proposed Model Statute is as follows:223 
(a) It is generally recognized that families have a 
substantial interest in organizing and attending funerals, 
which also includes wakes, memorial services, or burials for 
deceased relatives.224 
(b) A person is guilty of interference with a funeral, 
which also includes a wake, memorial service, or burial when 
he or she, at any time on any day  from one hour prior to, 
during, and one hour after: 
(1) Blocks, impedes, inhibits, or in any other 
manner obstructs or interferes with access into 
or from any building or parking lot of a building 
in which a funeral, wake, memorial service, or 
burial is being conducted, or any burial plot or 
the parking lot of the cemetery in which a 
funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial is 
being conducted; 
(2) Congregates, pickets, patrols, demonstrates, 
or enters on that portion of a public right-of-way 
or private property; or 
(3) Without authorization from the family of the 
deceased or person conducting the service, 
during a funeral, wake, memorial service, or 
                                                 
223 The proposed statute is composed of sections from various state funeral protest bans 
and this compilation is the contribution of the author. 
224 Okla. S. 1020.  The proposed additions to the section are italicized and are the 
contribution of the author. 
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burial: Sings, chants, whistles, shouts, yells, or 
uses a bullhorn, auto horn, sound amplification 
equipment, or other sounds or images 
observable to or within earshot of participants in 
the funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial.225 
(c) Such conduct is prohibited within 200 feet of any 
ingress or egress of that funeral, which also includes a 
wake, memorial service, or burial site.  For purposes of this 
Section: 
(1) “Funeral” means the ceremonies, rituals, 
processions, and memorial services held at a 
funeral site in connection with the burial, 
cremation, or memorial of a deceased person. 
(2) “Funeral site” means a church, synagogue, 
mosque, funeral home, mortuary, cemetery, 
gravesite, mausoleum, or other place at which a 
funeral is conducted or is scheduled to be 
conducted within the next 30 60 minutes or has 
been conducted within the last 30 60 minutes.226 
(d) “A person who violates this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to 
imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or a fine not 
exceeding $1,000 or both.  In addition, subsequent 
violations may lead to more severe fines not exceeding $5,000 
or imprisonment not exceeding 120 days.227 
C. Commentary on the Proposed Model Statute 
The proposed Model Statute incorporates parts from various, 
already ratified funeral protest bans.  In each section, the drafting was 
enhanced to cover different types of services connected with death, as 
well as to include specific timeframes everywhere in the statute.  The 
compilation utilized aspects from various statutes with strong drafting 
likely to withstand a First Amendment challenge.  Most statutes are 
already similar to this model and seem likely to be upheld.  The key 
                                                 
225 See Ky. H.R. 333.  The proposed amendments and additions are italicized or stricken 
with a line and are the contribution of the author. 
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components and constitutional weaknesses of most laws of this type, 
however, lie in extreme distance and time restrictions, vague language, 
and content-based language.  If a funeral protest ban can pass those 
elements, it is likely to remain on the books.  If funeral protest bans 
follow this pattern, courts will likely find them to be a constitutional way 
to protect the privacy of grieving families. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The WBC and its controversial funeral protests have sparked a 
complex constitutional dispute nation-wide.  Protecting speech is crucial, 
as is providing grieving families with privacy and honoring the dead, 
especially those that have died while serving our country.  Regardless of 
a person’s stance on homosexuality, war, funerals, or the appropriate 
reach of the First Amendment, the recently proposed and passed state 
funeral protest bans will continue to be passed in states and eventually 
challenged in court.  The proposed model statute seeks to strike the 
appropriate balance of rights and highlight drafting techniques to benefit 
states that have yet to propose such a bill as well as legislatures that may 
be forced to redraft their current statutes in the near future. 
Although most state protest bans will likely withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, a funeral protest ban will be most successful if it is content-
neutral, a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, contains clearly 
defined terms, is not vague or overbroad, sets reasonable distance and 
time requirements and punishments, and is equally enforced among all 
groups.  All of these components are necessary, as previous 
constitutional analysis and similar restrictions in other contexts 
discussed herein illustrate.  Despite other options, such as using the tort 
system, with the right clarity, reasonableness, and drafting, funeral 
protest bans can be crafted constitutionally and provide the best answer 
to any conflict of constitutional rights.  Furthermore, strong public 
support for their passage thus far makes it even more likely that, despite 
future court challenges and possible redrafting, legislatures will work 
hard to keep these statutes on the books. 
This issue presents a patriotic paradox: WBC spreading its message 
through its right to protest, legislatures following the will of the public 
and passing statutes with constitutional concerns, and, finally, soldiers 
who died protecting the freedoms of this country, among them the First 
Amendment.  Although the Free Speech clause can be viewed as 
promoting tolerance and necessary to the exchange of ideas, it raises 
emotional responses when put into a funeral context that may 
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overshadow free speech rights if not drafted carefully.  We must 
remember the warning from Texas v. Johnson: 
The way to preserve the flag’s special role is not to 
punish those who feel differently about these matters.  It 
is to persuade them that they are wrong 
. . . . 
We can imagine no more appropriate response to 
burning a flag than waving one’s own, no better way to 
counter a flag burner’s message than by saluting the flag 
that burns. . . . We do not consecrate the flag by 
punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the 
freedom that this cherished emblem represents.228 
For those who are grieving a loved one at a funeral and are 
disrupted by the WBC and its protests, placards, and lyrics that began 
this Note, it will no doubt be difficult to remember the First Amendment, 
respect the speech rights of the protestors, favor the ideals that your 
loved one died for over privacy at his or her funeral, and understand the 
constitutional concerns that surround the situation.  State funeral protest 
bans, if drafted carefully, can successfully balance the competing rights 
in this patriotic paradox. 
Kara Beil229 
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